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COMMENTS
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THE RAMIFICATIONS OF UNITED STATES v. FALK ON EQUAL PROTECTION

FROM PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION
The great discretion of the prosecutor to decide
who shall be charged with a crime has been long
recognized but little controlled. Speaking then as
Attorney General, Justice Robert Jackson warned
that:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America.... While the prosecutor at his best is
one of the most beneficient forces in our society,
when he acts from malice or other base motives, he
is one of the worst.1
Until recently, the courts have greatly restricted
the use of the equal protection clause as a defense
against prosecutorial discrimination. In United
States v. Falk,2 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit made this remedy more accessible by lowering the burden of proof required to raise the defense. Under this new standard, if a defendant can
raise a reasonable doubt about whether his prosecution was the result of purposeful discrimination,
then the burden of going forward with proof of
non-discrimination would shift to the prosecutor.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the
impact of Falk on the development of safeguards
for defendants against wrongful discrimination in
the decision to prosecute. This discussion will
include a review of the historical development of
the law on prosecutorial discrimination and an
analysis of the possible effects of Falk on criminal
law and the criminal justice system.
HistoricalDevelopment
The foundation of the law on prosecutorial discrimination was the establishment in 1880 of the
concept that the equal protection clause s applies to
executive as well as legislative state action.4 Seven
I Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor,31 J. Cns. L.C.
& P.s. 3 (1940).
2 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
3U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV § 1:
No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
4 EX Park Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879):
A state acts by its legislative, its executive, or its

years later, the Supreme Court applied the equal
protection clause to the executive branch in the
seminal case in the field of prosecutorial discrimination, Yick Wo v. Hopkins.5 In that case, a San
Francisco ordinance required that laundries not
made of brick or stone had to obtain approval to
operate from the Board of Supervisors. Because
permits were only granted to whites, Chinese laundrys were prevented from operating legally. The
petitioner, a Chinese, demonstrated that the
ordinance was only applied to people of his nationality. In frequently-quoted language, the Court
held that a conviction based on a law which is constitutional on its face may still be invalid if the
application of the law violates the equal protection
clause. 6 Discriminatory application of a statute
against a class (such as Chinese) was stated to be a
valid reason for overturning a conviction.
Despite the apparent holding of Yick Wo that
discriminatory prosecutions cannot be tolerated,
state courts have been reluctant to free defendants
on the sole ground that other people who committed the same acts were not also prosecuted.7
Because Yick Wo could not be ignored, state courts
attempted to distinguish the case in a series of
tortuous decisions.
The most popular interpretation of Yick Wo was
that it only applied to harmless statutory crimes
(malum prohibitum) but not to dangerous common
law crimes (malum in se). Therefore, courts reajudicial authorities. It can act in no other way.
The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean
that no agency of the State ... shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
6118 U.S. 356 (1886).
6Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.
Id.7 at 373-74.
See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory
Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Co m!. L. Rzv.
1103 (1961), for an exhaustive analysis of the reception of Yik Wo.
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soned that discriminatory prosecution was available as a valid defense for illegally operating a
laundry, but not for "vicious" crimes such as
pandering, 8 perjury 9 and gambling1 The invalidity
of the distinction was finally settled by the Supreme
Court's reassertion of Yick Wo in Oyler v. Boles.1
The Court clearly implied that the application of a
habitual criminal statute would be overturned if
the petitioner had shown deliberate discrimination.12 Because habitual criminal statutes deal only
with felonies (which are malum in,se), the Supreme
Court tacitly acknowledged that Yick Wo can be
used to prevent the prosecution of any type of
crime."
Another method of distinguishing Yick Wo was
to limit the holding to cases which involved both
an agency and its use of excessive discretion 4 The
invalidity of this distinction was also made clear
by the dicta in Oyler v. Boles,1 which implied that
although the prosecutor in Oyler was not part of an
agency exercising excessive discretion, Yick Wo
still would have been applicable.
Underlying this reluctance to accept Yick Wo
has been a feeling on the part of the courts that a
guilty man should not go free just because others
who committed the same crime were not prose' People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117
P.2d 437 (1941).
' People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d
118 (1943) (alternate holding).
10People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342
P.2d 538 (1959); People v. Van Randall, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 771, 296 P.2d 68 (1956). There is no wording
in Yick Wo which even implies that the holding should
be limited to the facts of the case.
1 368 U.S. 448 (1962)(dictum). Two defendants
claimed that the West Virginia habitual criminal
statute was discriminatorily applied to them because
the statute was very rarely used, even though it could
have been applied to almost a thousand men then in
West Virginia prisons.
Id. at 456.
11Despite Oyler, vestiges remain of the malum in
12

se---mnalum prohibilum distinction. State v. Baldonado,
79 N.M. 175, 441 P.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1968); Sims v.
Cunningham, 203 Va. 347, 124 S.E.2d 221 (1962).
Baldonado specifically follows People v. Montgomery,
47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).
1Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park District, 366
fll. 474, 9 N.E.2d 213 (1937)(alternate holding); Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich.
22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949). In Jackie Cab Co., the Park
District authorities were charged with only enforcing
an ordinance against black taxi drivers. The court
refused to grant an injunction because the Park District
was not a discretionary agency as was the Board of
Examiners in Yick Wo, yet certainly the Park District
could exercise as much discretion in enforcing a city
ordinance as could the Board of Examiners in granting
licences to laundrys.
15 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

cuted. This sentiment is similar to the apprehension
expressed by justice Cardozo about the exclusionary rule: the "criminal is to go free because the

constable has blundered." 16In recent cases such
as Mapp v. Ohio,17 however, the Supreme Court has
often made the difficult decision that
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law which sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence."
The philosophy of Mapp has been adopted by state
courts who, following Yick Wo and Oyler v. Boles,
have chosen to free defendants who have been discriminatorily selected for prosecution."
Although the right to the equal application of
the law is now fully accepted, the elements necessary to prove improper prosecutorial discrimination
are still unclear. One factor that has been required
by the great preponderance of authority is that the
discrimination must be intentional. The Supreme
Court clarified this requirement in the case of
Snowden v. Hughes." The petitioner claimed that
because of racial discrimination, his name had been
left off an election ballot. Because the petitioner
could not prove that the omission was intentional,
the Court refused to grant an injunction. Building
upon Yick Wo and Snowden, the Supreme Court in
Oyer v. Boles conclusively held that a prosecution is
valid where no evidence of purposeful discrimination is offered."1 Therefore, a defendant cannot rely
"1People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (1926).
"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
IId. at 659. Consider also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 480 (1966).
9 City of Ashland v. Heck's Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421,
424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966):
We find the constitutional right to be of greater
importance than our reluctance to give succor to
a passing law violator as an unavoidable incident
to the preservation of that right.
20321 U.S. 1 (1944)(alternate holding). Although
Snowdeni does not involve discrimination by a prosecutor, the requirement of showing intentional discrimination to raise the defense of equal protection
has been applied to cases involving prosecutors. Oyler
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Before Snowden,
some lower courts had already assumed that the demonstration of deliberateness was a necessary element in
proving improper prosecutorial discrimination. Boynton
v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 60 F.2d 851 (10th
Cir. 1932); People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139
P.2d 118 (1943).
1368 U.S. 448 (1962)(dictum). Since Snowden,
many claims of equal protection have failed because
of an inability to prove intentional prosecutorial discrimination. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357
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only on evidence that he was chosen for prosecution
when others similarly situated were allowed to go
free." Instead, the defendant must establish that
the prosecutor was improperly motivated in making his decision to charge. The heavy burden of
proving intentional discrimination" is justified by
the public policy that the prosecutor requires great
discretion to fulfill his quasi-judicial duties."
Therefore, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation."

21

A second element in establishing the defense of
prosecutorial discrimination has been the requiremeat that the defendant demonstrate that he is
part of a class which has been discriminated
against. This requirement was originally specified
in Yick Wo and then used as an alternative holding
in Sizowden. 6 Oyler v. Boles clarified this requirement by holding that prosecutorial discretion is
only unconstitutional if "deliberately based on an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
another arbitrary classification."

7

Although the courts have never explained their
reasons, the requirement of class discrimination
probably stems from doctrines which guarantee
equal protection from discriminatory legislation.
The rule in this field has been that there is no
violation of equal protection if the legislative classi(1953) (dictum) (vagrancy charges); Rhinehart v. Rhay,
440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1971) (sodomy charge); Moss v.
Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963)(Sunday closing
law); United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462
(2d Cir. 1962)(refusal to fill out census form); Oregon
v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d 794 (1958)(habitual
criminal statute). Two isolated, although recent decisions have held that intentional discrimination need
not be shown. City of Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407
S.W.2d 421, 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); People v. Millstein, 54 Misc. 2d 493, 283 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Long Beach
City Ct. 1967)(dictum). The latter decision was repudiated by another New York judge one year later.
People v. Derison, 57 Misc. 2d 1003, 294 N.Y.S.2d
339 (Long Beach City Ct. 1968).
"2Similarly, the mere fact that a law has not been
used for a long time does not prove intentional discrimination. Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d
915 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Sanders v. Waters, 199 F.2d 317
(10th Cir. 1952); Grell v. United States, 112 F.2d 861
(8th Cir. 1940).
2See
text accompanying note 33 infra for discussion
of proof problems.
24 See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (opinion by then Circuit judge Burger).
The necessity of prosecutorial discretion is discussed
in the text accompanying note 125 infra.
25 368 U.S. at 456.
26 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944). The fact that some blacks
were allowed on the ballot defeated the petitioner's
claim that he, a black, had been denied equal protection of the laws by being excluded from the ballot.
7368 U.S. at 456.

[Vol. 65

fications have a reasonable relationship to the
goals of the legislatorsss Similarly, a prosecutor
cannot select defendants for reasons which are
unrelated to his job of enforcing the law. 2"
The requirement of showing discrimination
toward a class provides indirect evidence of intentional discrimination by showing a disparity of
treatment between classes. If an indivMual can
show a difference in treatment between himself
and those not prosecuted, then courts may allow
him to raise the defense of prosecutorial discrimination. Although such a defendant cannot claim he
is part of a persecuted class, certainly his right
to equal protection of the laws has been just as
seriously violated." In fact, courts have recently
allowed an individual to argue that he is the victim of personal hostility."
In summary, the defense of prosecutorial discrimination has developed two requirements that
the defendants must meet: they must show that
the discrimination was deliberate and that it was
based on a characteristic of a class which separates
it from those who were not prosecuted. Few de2
fendants have fulfilled both these requirements."
"See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).

29 For example, a prosecutor may not enforce Sunday
closing laws only against cut-rate drug stores while
regular stores are allowed to remain open. The discrimination against a class of stores is unrelated to the
prosecutor's duty of enforcing the law. People v. Utica
Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d
128 (1962).

0No court has attempted to answer the question

of whether the class requirement of Oyler means that
an individual cannot raise the defense of prosecutorial
discretion.
"'Two New York courts have found that deprivations of property involving personal hostility warranted the defense of equal protection. Burt v. City of
New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946)(Hand, J.)
(architect lost building contract because of personal
hostility of city officials); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d
901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200 N.E.2d 779 (1964)(mem.)
(charged with building violations after involvement
in payoffs to inspectors). Both cases are susceptible to
being distinguished on the ground that they do not
actually involve a prosecutor's decision.
32Since Yick Wo, only a few defendants have successfully stated a cause of action through the defense
of prosecutorial discrimination. The trend, however,
seems to be toward more often allowing this defense.
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972)
(refusal to answer census questions); United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (disorderly
conduct at a demonstration); People v. Gray, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967) (vandalism by
hanging campaign posters): People v. Harris, 182 Cal.
App. 25d 837, Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960) (gambling); City of
Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1966) (Sunday closing law); City of Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (Ct.
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How does a defendant prove that the prosecutor
has deliberately discriminated against him? The
Supreme Court has never specified what burden
of proof a defendant must meet to invalidate his
prosecution on these grounds. The consensus of
the few state courts which have come to grips with
the problem is that the defendant must establish
improper discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.P
The task of proving intentional discrimination
is the greatest problem confronting the defendant.
Because the prosecutor need not testify as to his
own motives in choosing a case for prosecution 34
the defendant must establish by inference that
there was an improper motive.
The most common attempt to prove intentional
discrimination has been to create an inference
with statistical comparisons. For example, in Yick
Wo, the defendant demonstrated that all 150
people who were arrested for violating the ordinance were Chinese.85 Although this method occasionally has been successful,36 it requires an inference by the court. In Yick Wo this inference was
made when the Supreme Court reasoned that such
a figure must be the result of deliberate discrimination against Chinese. Most courts, however, have
found statistical comparisons inadequate for two
reasons. First, a showing that many people in the
App. 1933) (Sunday closing law); People v. Walker,
14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200 N.E.2d 779
(1964); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div.
2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
mPeople v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1967) (clear preponderance); People v.
Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962) (preponderance).
14No court has ever forced a prosecutor to testify
as to his motives. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616,
631 (7th Cir. 1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting). The
only possible exception before Falk is the recent case of
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
The court acquitted the defendant because the prosecution failed to rebut the incriminating evidence introduced by the defendant. Although the court did
not specify that the prosecutor must have personally
testified, this would seem to be the obvious way for the
prosecutor to demonstrate that his motives were
proper35
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3
6Statistics also were successful in proving discrimination in the following cases. In United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972), the defendant
showed that all four people who had been charged
with not filling out census forms were members of an
anti-census organization, while six nonmembers who
also had not filled out forms were not charged. In
People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr.
852 (1960), the court agreed to hear evidence that far
more blacks than whites were being charged with
gambling.

same situation as the defendant are not charged
may prove only that the enforcement of a statute
has been lax, rather than intentionally discriminatory.Y Second, because the prosecutor may not
have known of the existence of other violators, his
discrimination may have been unintentional. It
has even been suggested that statistical comparison
is never appropriate to prove prosecutorial discrimination.89
Another method of proof is simply to point to
similarly situated groups which have not been
prosecuted. This method was successful in United
States v. Crowthers,40 where the defendants, members of an anti-war group, demonstrated that military bands had been much more disruptive than
the defendants but had not been prosecuted for
disorderly conduct. Usually, however, this method
is found inadequate because the comparison group
was not similar enough to the defendant to raise
an inference of intentional discrimination against
a class.4 No matter which method of proof is
used, the defendant faces an uphill struggle in
attempting to establish the defense of prosecutorial
discrimination.
Alternative Metlods of CurtailingDiscretion
In order to assess the impact of United States v.
Falk on criminal law, it is important to consider
if there are any alternative methods of curtailing
the improper use of prosecutorial discretion. State
1 Oregon v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d
794 (1958)(no injunction was granted even though it
was shown that only twenty-four were convicted
under a habitual criminal statute when 984 people
were eligible).
38Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) See note
22 supra.
39People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1967)(dictum). In other aspects of criminal
law statistics are sometimes conclusive proof of unconstitutional discrimination. For example, statistical
comparisons are regularly used to determine if juries
have been discriminatorily selected. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958); Finkelstein, The
Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1966).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291, 309 (1972),
Justices Brennan and Stewart found the death penalty
to be used so rarely that there is a presumption of
arbitrariness.
10456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
41Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905) (dictum)
(evidence failed to show that non-Chinese were not
arrested for gambling); People v. Pam, 38 Misc. 2d
296, 238 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Crim. Ct. 1963) (no allegation
that similar stores were allowed to operate on Sundays);
State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D.
1966) (no allegation that any other stores allowed to
operate on Sundays).

COMMENT

laws which authorize the power of the prosecutor
usually are too vague to offer guidelines against
2
which a prosecutor's conduct can be comparedY.
Furthermore, statutory checks on the prosecutor
are aimed at stopping a failure to bring cases, not
arbitrary decisions to prosecute.4
One statutory provision with significant possibilities for checking discretion is a law that allows
judges to dismiss any indictment on their own
motion in the interests of justice." However, few
states have such statutes,45 and the states without
them will not allow a judge to second-guess the
prosecutor. 4 If this authority were widespread,
conscientious judges could insure that at least in
their courtrooms, prosecutors did not discriminate
improperly against classes of defendants.
Other possible controls from within the criminal
justice system have not been effective in checking
discretion. Although intended to be a check on the
prosecutor, a the grand jury has been ineffective in
detecting discrimination. First, the grand jury
has no way of knowing the prosecutor's motives in
bringing a case. Secondly, without an overview of
all the cases brought by the prosecutor, the grand
42 See generally, Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955). A typical example is the
law setting up the office of United States Attorney:
"[E]ach United States Attorney, within his district,
shall (1) prosecute for all offenses against the United

States ....

"

28 U.S.C. § 547 (1966). Ethical con-

siderations of the American Bar Association are only
slightly less vague: "A government lawyer who has
discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain
from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair." ABA, CODE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrTY E.C. 7-14. See also ABA STANDARDS,
THE PROSECUTION FUNcTioN AND T E DEFENSE
FuNcTIoN § 3.9 (Approved Draft 1971).

Elections are probably a poor check because of the
low visibility of most prosecutorial decisions. See K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 209 (1969).
4
thFor example, several states have provisions for
the state Attorney General to take over a local prosecutor's duties if that prosecutor fails to enforce the
law. F. MILER., PROSECUTION, THE DECISION To
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRnm 298 (1969).
4 In People v. Quill, 11 Misc. 2d 512, 177 N.Y.S.2d
380 (Kings County Ct. 1958), a state statute allowed
the trial judge to dismiss a criminal libel case in the
interests of justice.
46F. MILLER, supra note 43 at 335 n. 166.
4"In State ex rel. Ronan v. Stevens, 93 Ariz. 375, 381
P.2d. 100 (1963), a trial judge dismissed an indictment
because he felt that others committing the same crime
were not being charged. The appellate court held that
the judge had no such power in the absence of statutory
authority. In People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876,
342 P.2d 538 (1959), a similar result was reached when
a judge dismissed a case because he detected that only
blacks
were being charged with gambling.
47
Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and the

Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S. BAR J. 397, 399-400 (1967).
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jury cannot tell whether class discrimination is
occurring. The police check discretion by acting as
gatekeepers, sorting out those cases they wish to
present to the prosecutor." However, the prosecutor still has complete discretion over all cases
reaching his office and over those cases in which he
has initiated the investigation.
Collateral attacks by the defendant against the
prosecutor have been almost completely closed
off by the courts. The most obvious remedy is a
civil suit for malicious prosecution. However, the
great majority of courts have decided that because
of the prosecutor's great discretion, he must be
clothed with the same immunity from liability to
which judges are entitled. 49 Therefore, the prosecutor, while acting within the scope of his duty,
cannot be sued for malicious prosecution even if
he acts in bad faith. 0
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 has recently been
used successfully to obtain damages from police
officers in cases of misconduct." However, the
courts have held that in passing the Civil Rights
Act, Congress did not intend to overrule the
common law theory of judicial immunity, which
applies also to prosecutors. 52 Therefore, in most
circumstances the prosecutor can exercise his discretion justly or maliciously, without fear of civil
retaliation. 3
Commentators have recently advocated the
resurrection of the common law defense of desuetude 54 This defense invalidates a conviction based
18For a survey on how police use their discretion in
deciding which cases to take to the prosecutor, see
PRESmENT'S COMM SIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADmINSTRATION OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT:
Tax
49 COURTS 6 (1967).

The public policy behind the prosecutor's immunity is that he must not be deterred from aggressively enforcing the law nor must his time be wasted
defending himself. Zulkey, ProsecutorialImmunity: Its
Past and Its Future, 60 ILL. BAR J. 946-47 (1972).

60Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd

mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927).

" See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) The
most
often used provision is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
52
Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966). A
prosecutor may incur liability if he acts outside his
traditional role. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389,
410 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 915 (1973).
"A writ of mandamus is designed only to force a
public official to carry out his duty; mandamus cannot
prevent the commission of an act. Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1955).
' Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IowA L. Rxv. 389 (1964); Russo, Equal
ProtectionFrom the Law. The Substantive Requirements
for a Showing of Discriminatory Law Enforcement, 3

Loy. U. L. REv. 65 (1970). Both commentators argue
that if desuetude were revived, a defendant would no
longer have to prove the motive of the prosecutor, but
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on a law which has long been unused. In theory,
the failure to use the law makes it void, just as if
it were repealed by the legislature. In America,
however, desuetude has rarely been recognized as
a valid defense. 5
On balance, the arsenal of possible safeguards
against prosecutorial discretion provides almost
no check whatsoever on the prosecutor's decision
of whom to charge with a crime.56 In considering
Uitited States v. Falk, it should be kept in mind
that Falk may be the precursor of a doctrine which
will serve as the only deterrent to prosecutorial
discrimination. As Mapp v. Ohio7 acts to deter
improper police conduct in illegally seizing evidence, so may Falk serve to deter prosecutors from
using improper discrimination in bringing indictments.-"
The Falk Decision
Jeffrey Falk was convicted by a jury of three
counts of not possessing Selective Service registration and classification cards. 9 Falk argued at his
trial and on appeal that he was chosen for prosecution because he had publicly opposed the war in
Vietnam and had engaged in draft counseling.
Therefore, his conviction allegedly both chilled his
right to free speech and violated his right to equal
protection. The trial court refused to hear evidence
on prosecutorial discrimination in both a pre-trial
hearing and during the trial itself.
only that the statute under which he was convicted was
long
unused.
55
1 Bonfield, supra note 54 at 429, 439.
56In short, unless lawlessness is rampant, enforcement at a low level and public indignation at a
high one, the prosecutor is relatively immune from
sanctions that might influence routine decisionmaking.
F. Miller, supranote 42 at 305.
57367 U.S. 643 (1961).
u See notes 18 & 19 supra. It has been recognized
that the exclusionary rule must be maintained, at least
temporarily, because no adequate civil remedy has yet
been developeded to deter police from illegally seizing
evidence. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents 403 U.S. 388, 420-24 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting5. Until such a remedy is found, the only possible sanction is to exclude illegally-obtained evidence
from the trial. Similarly, unless other remedies are
available to curtail improper prosecutorial discrimination, the only sanction possible may be to block the
prosecution itself.
5950 U.S.C. § 462 (App. 1970). The jury found Falk
also guilty of failing to submit to the draft, but the
trial judge dismissed this count in a post-trial motion
on the grounds that there was no basis in fact for the
Selective Service Board to deny Falk conscientious objector status. Falk was sentenced by the trial judge to
three years imprisonment, a sentence later described as
unnecessarily harsh. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d
616, 624 (7th Cir. 1973) (Fairchild, J., concurring).

The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed
the trial court, remanding the case to a new district court judge with orders to hold a hearing on
whether there was improper prosecutorial discrimination." The majority in the four-three decision established a new test for raising the claim
of prosecutorial discrimination: if the defendant
can establish a reasonable doubt as to whether
there was improper discrimination in his prosecution, then the burden of going forward with proof
shifts to the government to demonstrate that its
motives were proper." The majority held that the
facts alleged by Falk fulfilled this requirement.
The court specifically noted that it expected the
prosecutor who originally brought the case to
answer the allegations of the defendant by testifying in court.2
The majority opinion and the dissenting opinion
of judge Cummings clashed over two issues. First,
what is the proper standard of proof for raising
the question of prosecutorial discretion? Second,
did the facts in this case establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by any standards?
In answering the first question, the majority
decision relied on Yick Wo and Oyler v. Boles. The
court followed the now-established doctrine that
an injunction against prosecution is possible when
a defendant proves he has been the victim of intentional, improper discrimination." The court
unhesitatingly interpreted Oyler v. Boles to mean
that this discrimination can be directed against
an individual as well as against a class."
United States v. Steele6" provides strong support
for the court's reliance on Yick Wo. In Steele, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned
a conviction on the grounds that the prosecution
discriminated against the defendant because he
asserted his right of free speech. The defendant,
SoA three-man court of appeals panel originally upheld the trial court. United States v. Faik, 472 F.2d
1101 (7th Cir. 1972) (Cummings, J.) (2-1 decision). The
reasoning of Judge Cummings in the majority opinion
is the same as his dissent in the rehearing. United States
v. Falk, 479 F.2d at 625.
61479 F.2d at 624.
MId. at 623.
6
Id. at 618-21.
14 Id. at 619. No court had previously tried to determine whether the Supreme Court in Oyler had intended to allow individuals, as opposed to classes, to
claim the defense of prosecutorial discrimination. However, there is no reason why an individual would not be
just as entitled to protection from a prosecution based
on arbitrary standards of selection. See People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200 N.E.2d 779
(1964) and accompanying text.
65 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
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an activist against the census, refused to answer
census questions on the grounds that they violated
his privacy. The defendant demonstrated that nonactivists in Hawaii who did not answer the questions were not prosecuted, while all four prosecutions were of census opponents. Steele shows the
viability of Yick Wo and the fact that engaging
in free speech is an improper basis for discrimination. 66
In the dissenting opinion in Falk, Judge Cummings vigorously objected to the majority's justification for looking into the prosecutor's motive in
charging a suspect.Y The dissent argued that as a
matter of general policy the judiciary should not
pry into the motives of the executive branch in
effectuating policy decisions. To maintain the
separation of powers, the judiciary should not
second-guess decisions by executive officers made
in the scope of their duties.
The dissent relied on United States v. O'Brien"
and McCray v. United States,69 both of which are
distinguishable from the instant case. Both cases
dealt with judicial consideration of legislative, not
prosecutorial intent. This distinction is important
because the legislature's ability to discriminate is
checked by judicial review of a statute's constitutionality, but discrimination by a prosecutor is
accomplished in secret. The only way for the
judiciary to check the prosecutor is to inquire into
his motives.
O'Brien also can be distinguished on its facts.
The defendant burned his draft card, committing
an offense which is strictly enforced. Because
almost all those who commit this crime are
charged, the prosecutor has little opportunity for
discrimination in selecting defendants. In Falk,
however, the offense of not possessing a draft card
rarely has been enforced, thus allowing the prosecutor great discretion.
The specific authorities relied on by the majority
tend to overwhelm the general policy statements
cited by the dissent. Unable to deny the concrete
precedent of the line of cases developed from Yick
Wo, 70 the dissent could only argue on policy
6
1 The court also cited United States v. Crowthers,
456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of
Crowthers, see text accompanying note 90 infra.
G7479 F.2d at 625-31.
68391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this case, the Supreme
Court refused to inquire into Congress' purpose in
making draft card burning a crime.
69195 U.S. 27 (1904). In this case the Court declined
to look for a wrongful motive behind special treatment
of oleomargarine.
70 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States
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grounds that the use of the equal protection clause
against prosecutorial discrimination should not
allow one branch of government to pry into the
motives of another. The majority stood on firmer
ground in building on the established principles of
Yick Wo.
The second area of disagreement between the
majority and dissenting opinions concerned
whether the allegations of the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination2' The
dissent argued persuasively that the facts alleged
by the defendant did not even meet the reasonable
doubt test offered by the majority.
The majority relied heavily on the offer of proof
made by Falk that 25,000 men who had turned in
their draft cards had not been prosecuted. 2 The
dissent replied that simply showing that other
people were not prosecuted for the same crime has
never been sufficient to raise the defense of prosecutorial discrimination.73 According to the dissent,
the defendant must prove that he has the same
important characteristics as those who were not
prosecuted, except for one factor which caused
the defendant to be selected for prosecutionY4 In
Falk, the exercise of free speech was the distinguishing factor, but Falk failed to allege that the
25,000 who were not prosecuted did not also
engage in free speech. If all those who turned in
their draft cards were also engaging in free speech,
then Falk cannot claim that he was discriminated
against on that basis.
The majority also gave weight to a Selective
Service policy statement that called for not
prosecuting cases where draft cards were turned
v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). For the
dissent's response to Steele and Crowthers, see note 74
i4fra.
71Because of the changes in criminal procedure made
in Falk, it may be particularly important to determine
what facts the majority found were sufficient to shift
the burden of proof to the government. Future courts
may be anxious to distinguish Falk on its facts.
72479 F.2d at 621.
78Id. at 626-28. Laxness of enforcement is never a
defense. See note 22 supra. Furthermore, to prove discrimination it must be shown that the prosecutor knew
of 74
these other offenses. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. at 456.
See note 41 supra for examples of cases where the
defendants failed to distinguish themselves from those
not charged with the crime. The dissent in Falk uses
this basis to distinguish the majority's three major
cases: Yick Wo; United States v. Steele 461 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1972); and United States v. Crowthers, 456
F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). 479 F.2d at 627-28. In each
of those cases, the defendant demonstrated that the alleged reason for discrimination was the only factor
separating him from those who were not prosecuted.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION

in.7 Instead, draft officials were instructed to
handle these cases administratively. The majority
wanted to know why the Government violated
this policy three years after Falk turned in his
draft cardsY The dissent provided a possible
answer. W After the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States in 1970, the Government
was precluded from punishing draft opponents by
moving up their induction dates. In response to
this decision, the Government had to start prosecuting those who turned in draft cards if they were
to be punished at all. This provided a possible
explanation why 25,000 men were not prosecuted
and Falk was. The Government began prosecuting
those who were passed up, making the "discrimination" in Falk's case a factor of chance, not evil
intent. The majority acknowledged this possibility
but placed the burden on the Government to prove
its validityY9
The evidence most incriminating to the government was a statement to Falk's attorney by the
Assistant United States Attorney who tried the
case. The prosecutor allegedly refused to compromise with the defense attorney because the government wanted to stop Falk's lawful draft counseling
activities. Furthermore, the trial prosecutor revealed during the trial that the decision to prosecute Falk had been reviewed by the Department
of Justice in Washington. The majority felt that
this procedure was highly unusual and created an
inference that the government was singling out
Falk for prosecution 0
The dissent had little response to the highly incriminating admission that Falk's draft counseling
was the reason for his prosecution. 8 ' But the fact
that the decision to prosecute was approved by
several people was seen by the dissent to lessen
'the importance of one man's opinion as to why
Falk was charged.P The dissent also suggested an
alternative reason why the Department of Justice
would become involved: a high administrative decision was necessary to direct lower officials on
7r 479
76

F.2d at 621.

Id. at 622

77 Id.

at 632-33.

78 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
79 479 F.2d at 621.
8
1Id. at 622.
81

Id. at 633-34. The dissent did point out that the
prosecutor who made the statement was not yet workig for the Government when the indictment was
handed down. However, his statement implied that he
heard about the prevailing policy of the office in regard
to this case.
82Id. at 633.

what to do with cases that could no longer be
handled administratively because of GutkneclztY'
The dissent raised an additional argument which
sought to undercut the basis for the majority's
reasoning. The dissent suggested that it was not
improper discrimination to prosecute someone
who is highly visible to the public and whose conviction would therefore have a strong deterrent
effect." Although this may chill an individual's
free speech, it was felt that the purpose of the
prosecution is reasonably related to the goal of
stopping crime by enforcing the law. The majority
apparently disagreed with this analysis,"9 but
neither side was able to marshall authorities in its
favor8 6 However, the majority avoided this argument by relying on the trial prosecutor's statement
that the Government was attempting to curtail
Falk's legal draft counseling activity. There is no
doubt that the Government cannot intentionally
hamper lawful activities (especially free speech)
by prosecuting on highly discretionary chargesP'
In retrospect, the alleged admission to the defense attorney is probably the only allegation
which, if proven in a hearing, would establish
improper discriminationPu None of the other offers
8mId.

at 634-35.
Id.
at 619-20.
8
6 One court commenting on the subject agreed with
the dissenting view that deterrence is a proper standard
for discretion. People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App.
Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
87 Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965):
It is dearly unconstitutional to enable a public
official to determine which expressions of view will
be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups
either by use of a statute providing a system of
broad licensing power or, as in this case, the
equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.
8 Although not argued by defense counsel, the majority raised one more argument to prove discrimination. 479 F.2d at 622-23. The trial prosecutor also allegedly admitted to the defense attorney that the
Government's case was weak on the count involving
refusal to submit for induction. See note 59 supra. The
majority concluded from this that by bringing draft
card charges against the defendant, the prosecution
was discriminating against an individual who was exercising his first amendment right to ask for the status
of conscientious objector. Theoretically, if Falk had not
asked to be classified as a conscientious objector, the
draft card counts would have been dropped. The dissent correctly pointed out in rebuttal that Falk had no
constitutional right to refuse an order to report for
induction. Furthermore, even if the Government's case
was thought to be weak, it was strong enough to convince a jury beyond reasonable doubt. 479 F.2d at 63536. Therefore, the Government should be assumed to
have used good faith in prosecuting Falk for illegally
refusing induction.
4Id. at 634.

85

COMMENT

of proof actually possess the potential for demonstrating that Falk was prosecuted because he
exercised his first amendment rights.
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ination. When a prima facie case of racial discrimination is proven in such areas as housing,93
employment,94 and grand jury selection, 95 it is
well-established that the defendant possessing the
The Impact of Falk
facts must shoulder the burden of proof. The
If Falk were widely followed, the largest change rationale for this standard of proof is that the
in the law of equal protection from prosecutorial only way to prove racial discrimination is to force
the party with knowledge of the facts to go fordiscrimination would be in the new burden of
proof. Instead of having to prove discrimination ward with evidence to refute the created presumpby a preponderance of the evidence, 9 under Falk tion of discrimination. Without this standard, the
a defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt to plaintiff would have great difficulty in establishing
shift the burden of going forward with proof to that the actions of the defendant were motivated
the prosecution. The court did not discuss the by racial bias. 6 The applicability of this standard
derivation of this standard other than to ac- of proof to prosecutorial discrimination is obvious.
knowledge that it was borrowed from United A victim of prosecutorial discrimination is faced
States v. Crowthers.9 Following Yick Wo, the court with the difficult task of proving that the prosecuin Crowthers set aside a conviction for disorderly tor intentionally discriminated against the defendconduct because the anti-war defendants were less ant.9 Because the prosecutor holds the knowledge
disorderly than non-political groups (such as of what other cases he chose not to prosecute, he
military bands) who performed at the same place should be required to go forward with proof of a
and were not prosecuted. Although the court did legitimate purpose in order to rebut the inference
of improper motive raised by the defendant. In
not use this standard in reaching its decision, 91 it
suggested that if a defendant could establish a effect, the court in Falk has engrafted the standard
prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden of proof in racial discrimination cases on the line
of going forward with proof shifts to the party of prosecutorial discrimination cases developed
having knowledge of the true facts. Because in from Yick Wo.
Falk does not specify what is required to raise
Crowthers the Government had knowledge that
other noisy demonstrations had occurred, it would a reasonable doubt of prosecutorial discrimination.
have had the obligation to come forward with In general, when questions of shifting burdens of
evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination proof arise, the only guideline is that the party
9 2
must present evidence to "entitle himself to a
raised by the defendants.
The Court in Crowthers borrowed this standard ruling that the opponent should fail if he does
of proof from cases dealing with racial discim- nothing more in the way of producing evidence." 9s
89See People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. Applying this guideline to Falk, the defendant
Rptr. 211 (1967); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 presented enough evidence of prosecutorial disApp. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1962).
crimination to reverse his conviction, unless the
90456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). This standard is
similar to one implied in dicta by the Ninth Circuit. Government was able to rebut the inference of
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). discrimination with evidence of a proper exercise
For an argument in favor of such a standard, see
Givelber, The Application of Equal ProtectionPrinciples
9342 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) is used to stop racial disto Sdecive Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. crimination in housing. Once the plaintiff has proven
hL. L. F. 88 (1973).
certain prescribed elements indicating discrimination,
91The court found the evidence of discrimination so the defendant must come foreward with evidence to
complete that the Government could not possibly give rebut the inference of discrimination. Bush v. Kaim,
a satisfactory explanation of its motives. 456 F.2d at 297 F.Supp. 151, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
1078. Therefore, the question of shifting burdens of
91Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Educaproof was not involved in the court's holding.
tion,
364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1961).
9
92 It is neither novel nor unfair to require the
1Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88 (1955).
party in possession of the facts to disclose them.
96 For example, in Chambers,364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th
(citation omitted). We think defendants made a
Cir. 1961), a group of black school teachers presented
sufficient prima facie showing that application of
statistical evidence that created an inference of racial
the noise and obstruction regulation to them was
discrimination in the firing of several teachers. Howpretensive and that the government, being in posever, conclusive proof would not be possible unless the
session of the facts as to noise and obstruction of
members of the Board of Education were required to
approved activity, should have come forward with
state the reasons why each teacher had been fired. 364
evidence, if it could, to rebut the inference of a
F.2d at 192.
double standard.
97See the discussion at note 20 supra.
Id. at 1078.
" WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2494, at 293 (3d ed. 1940).

1974]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION

of prosecutorial selectivity. The amount of proof
required in each case must be decided by the judge
in relation to the nature of the discrimination
sought to be proved. No one label describes the
standard of proof necessary to shift the burden.
The court in Folk uses the terms "prima fade"
and "reasonable doubt" interchangeably.9 9 Other
courts dealing with shifting burdens have used
terms such as "inference," 110"strong inference," M
02
and "strong tendency." 1
Despite the reduction in the burden of proof
from preponderance of the evidence to reasonable
doubt, .defendants will still encounter great difficulty in successfully raising the defense of prosecutorial discrimination. First, the burden of persuasion never shifts from the defendant. 1 Even if the
defendant does raise a reasonable doubt, the
prosecution is then allowed to rebut the inference
of discrimination. If the prosecution succeeds,
then the defendant must still prove by a preponderance-of the evidence 4 that there has been improper discrimination. The effect of Folk, therefore, is to adopt a low threshold of proof which
will force the prosecutor to reveal and defend his
motives. The ultimate burden of persuasion, however, remains the same.
Another obstacle to such a defense is that courts
have always been hostile to the doctrine that convicted criminals must be freed when others who
committed the same acts were not prosecuted.105
If courts are forced to adopt Flk, their hostility
is likely to manifest itself in skepticism over
attempts to prove that the motives of the prosecutor were improper. Furthermore, the unusual fact
of the prosecutor's admission of motive in Falk
may allow courts to distinguish Folk from cases
that follow. If Folk is widely adopted, prosecutors
are certain to become taciturn in the presence of
the defendant's counsel. Because a defendant still
must prove intentional discrimination, he will still
face an arduous task in raising even the lesser
standard of reasonable doubt.
In the absence of a talkative prosecutor, how

will a defendant prove intentional discrimination?
The use of statistical comparisons will only be
successful if the defendant can prove that the
basis of the alleged discrimination is not common to
any of the people who were not prosecuted. Future
courts are unlikely to be as lenient as the majority
in Falk in drawing an inference of discrimination
from the naked fact that others were not prosecuted.
Even if a defendant can prove he was picked out
for prosecution, he must also establish that the
basis for the discrimination was impermissiblei 00
One probably legitimate basis for discrimination
which has already been discussed is to prosecute a
highly visible offender with the intent of creating
an effective deterrent to others. The court in Folk
did not consider the possibility that the purpose of
prosecuting Falk may have been to deter others
from discarding their draft cards. Future courts,
however, may not question prosecutions when the
prosecutor can prove that deterrence was the
motive for charging a figure in the public eye.
Certain routine grounds for selectivity have
always been approved. For example, the prosecutor may conserve law enforcement resources by
selecting individuals at randomj'7 The prosecutor
may also indict an individual for the purpose of
developing a test case.0 1 Another common ground
for discriminating is to grant immunity to several
offenders in return for testimony which would
hopefully convict another offender who is otherwise difficult to reach. It might be argued that the
Government has improperly discriminated by
allowing equally guilty offenders to go free in the
process of convicting the defendant.i 9 However,
courts have consistently held that it is within the
prosecutor's discretion to conduct a case however
he sees fit, including giving immunity to known
offenders n ' ° In order to raise the defense of prosecutorial discrimination, the defendant would have
to demonstrate that the granting of immunity was
itself based on improper motives, such as a personal or racial dislike for the defendant.
10
6 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
09479 F.2d at 620, 623-24.
100
364
F.2d
189,
192
(4th
Cir.
1961).
107People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d
101
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
0 MacKay Telegraph Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S.
1972).
10 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 88 (1955).
94 (1919) (dictum).
10See McCopmscK, EVIxECE § 336 (2d ed. 1972).
09 This argument would be most likely to be raised
104Because the court in Falk did not substitute a new by powerful figures who are ordinarily difficult to proseburden of persuasion, it should be assumed that the cute, such as leaders of organized crime and public
defendent must still prove discrimination by a pre- officials charged with official misconduct.
ponderance of the evidence. See note 33 supra.
,10Saunders v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1932)
105 See the discussion on the development of Yick Wo (dictum); State v. Jourdain, 225 La. 1030, 74 So. 2d
accompanying note 8 supra.
203 (1954).
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Another proper means of selectivity is to convict
a suspected dangerous criminal of a petty crime."'.
A typical example is the prosecution of a suspected
hard drug dealer for possession of a small amount
of marijuana. The prosecutor can charge a suspected criminal with any petty crime he has
actually committed, even if most people are not
prosecuted for the same crime." 2
Even under Falk the range of permissible prosecutorial discretion is great. An individual hoping
to raise the defense of prosecutorial discretion
must allege that he has been discriminated against
on grounds which are clearly unrelated to the goals
of effective law enforcement, such as free speech,
race, religion, nationality, personal hostility, or
some other completely arbitrary distinction.
Because Falk does not change the ultimate
burden of persuasion, perhaps the greatest practical change mandated by Falk is that once the defendant raises a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor
must personally testify at the hearing. Because
many prosecutors may become involved in preparing and reviewing a single case,"' it is yet to be
decided exactly who would be required to testify.
The unhappy possibility that everyone connected
with the case would testify must be dealt with by
future courts. Because of the clearly intolerable
burden of tying up several prosecutors whenever
a hearing on equal protection is held, courts would
probably attempt to limit the number who testify
to only those most likely to have made the decision to prosecute. The defense also gains a significant advantage by being able to cross-examine
the prosecutor as to his motives. The dissent in
Falk pointed out that in order to convince the
judge that the prosecutor's motives were proper,
the prosecutor would have to reveal his true
motives to counter the inferences raised by the
defendant's

allegations." 4

In

some

cases,

the

prosecutor would have to rely entirely on his own
word in rebutting the defendant's evidence. Under
skillful cross-examination, this self-serving statement of purpose may be unpersuasive to the judge.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the
prosecutor only need testify after the defense has
"'United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.
1970). The defendant, a suspected organized crime
figure, was convicted of violating alien registration laws.
" However, the defendant must be suspected of
committing other crimes, not of engaging in unpopular
legal activities. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58
(1965).
MAbrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
ProsecutorialDiscretion,19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 6 (1971).
11 479 F.2d at 631.

[Vol. 65

raised a reasonable doubt-a burden which will
continue to frustrate most defendants.
An interesting aspect to the legal impact of Falk
is that even if an injunction is granted, its effect
may only be temporary. Courts have agreed that
if the prosecutor starts applying a law impartially,
then the defendant who was freed can be successfully prosecuted if he commits the same crime
again." 5 If the injunction is granted upon a pretrial motion, then double jeopardy would not
attach," 6 thus probably allowing the government
7
to re-indict the defendant for the same crime."
In either case, an injunction against prosecution
may not permanently protect a defendant.
In summary, not many defendants will be able
to raise even a reasonable doubt that they have
been the victims of intentional discrimination.
Few defendants will be in a position to argue that
the basis of their selection was improper, and of
those that can so argue, fewer still will be able to
prove that the motives of the prosecutor were
evil.
The Falk decision may also have a significant
impact on the operation of the criminal justice
system. Whenever a court changes criminal procedure to broaden defendants' rights or remedies,
the dissenting opinion will usually warn of the impending flood of new cases which will inundate the
courthouses.us Were Falk adopted broadly, this
apocalyptic prediction might not be far off target.
Because of the significantly lower threshold of
proof required to get the prosecutor on the stand,
defendants who are already on trial will be encouraged to throw up another defense by arguing
that they were the victims of improper discrimination.Y9

n5 Wade v. City and County of San Francisco, 82
Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947); City of Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (Ct.
App. 1933); people v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App.
Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 128 (1962).
U6 Double jeopardy usually does not attach until the
jury has been impaneled. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973).
17 Of course the government cannot prosecute if the
statute of limitations has run on the original offense.
11 The dissent in Falk is no exception:

[T]here are few criminal defendants who will be
unable to make assertions as bald and unspecific
as defendant's, and naturally there is now mcentive to make them.
479 F.2d at 625.
119Despite the fact that few defendants would be
likely to succeed on such issues, the claims would
be raised anyway since the criminal defendant is
already in court and his motivation is strong to
make any argument that either delays the process
or provides even the remotest chance of success.
Abrams, supra note 113, at 53.
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The effect of Falk may be analogous to the
broadening of federal habeas corpus rights: many
more prisoners have petitioned for writs of habeas
corpus, but few have been successful.V 0 Similarly,
many more defendants may raise the defense of
prosecutorial discrimination, but few will be successful in fulfilling the threshold standard of
reasonable doubt, and far fewer still will eventually
gain an injunction against prosecution. 21 Even
under Falk defendants must overcome skeptical
courts and the heavy obstacles of proving intentional discrimination based on improper grounds.
Nevertheless, more crowded court dockets may
become a legacy of the Falk decision which probably will be considered by future courts in deciding
whether to adopt Falk in other jurisdictions."'
Another possible effect of Falk is to hamper
prosecutors in their duties. As the prosecutor's
role has evolved, he has assumed tremendous discretion in deciding what laws should be enforced
and who should be prosecuted. 12 Consequently,
120
Rights of state prisoners under federal habeas
corpus were significantly expanded in three Warren
Court decisions: Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). These decisions encouraged
more state prisoners to petition for habeas corpus.
Although the number of petitions jumped from 1,903
in 1963 to 6,331 in 1968, very few of these petitions
have resulted in the prisoner's freedom. C. WIGHT,
LAW OF FEDEPAL CouRTs 217-18 (2d ed. 1970).
Falk may contribute to the increase in habeas petitions. A prisoner may argue in his petition that his
conviction should be thrown out because of prosecutorial discrimination. Such a remedy was implicitly
sanctioned in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
12Not only will few defendants be released, but
most of those that are released will not have committed
serious crimes. Prosecutors have a much greater opportunity to discriminate when lesser crimes are involved which are generally not prosecuted because they
are unimportant. See Comment, The Right to NondiscrimninatoryEnforcent of State Penal Laws, 61 COLum.
L. REv. 1103, 1140 (1961).
2'If the experience with habeas corpus petitions is
applicable, the increase in cases that Falk might generate is not unmanageable. Despite the enormous increase in habeas corpus petitions, a recent study coneluded that consideration of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus comprise only a small part of the total
work load of Federal district courts. Note, The Burden
of Federal Habeas Corpus PetitionsfroynState Prisoners,
52 1VA.
L. Rnv. 486, 506 (1966).
13Viewed in broad prospective, the American legal
system seems to be shot through with many excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers but
the one that stands out above all others is the
power to prosecute.
K. DAvis, DlsCRaoNARY JusTicE 188 (1969). For
general discussions of the discretion exercised by the
prosecutor, see F. MI=R, PRosEcuION: T= DECISION TO CIARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CR15
(1969);
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Bxercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rsv. 1 (1971);
Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, J.

the prosecutor often takes on the role theoretically
reserved to the judge: to decide in the interests of
justice whom society should punish for breaking
its laws, and even what form that punishment
should take. 2 Because the courts do not have the
resources to hear every case which comes to the
attention of the prosecutor, this exercise of discretion is essentialV2 If the prosecutor had no
discretion, the court system would immediately
break down under the burden of hearing a plethora
of petty cases.
If Falk results in prosecutors having to testify
often as to their motives,"' the prosecutor's discretion might be significantly impaired. Revealing
the internal policies of the prosecutor's office might
embarrass the prosecutor and create distrust in
the general publicP7 For example, a prosecutor
may not wish to disclose a policy of not enforcing
marijuana laws when the offenders are not selling
large quantities or harder drugs. Similarly, a
prosecutor may be forced to reveal secret plans,
such as a plan of using immunity and informers to
eventually convict an organized crime figure.
Rather than make public the policies of the office,
prosecutors may be forced to drop important cases
that would otherwise be won.
Falk may also restrict discretion by hampering
plea bargaining. The fear of revealing discriminatory
motives may inhibit a prosecutor in discussions
with the defendant's attorney. The prosecutor
cannot strengthen his bargaining position by
telling the defense attorney that the prosecutor's
office is extremely anxious to convict the defendant and therefore will not compromise. The
Falk case is a specific lesson that such bravado
Cmm. L.C. & P.S. 770 (1933); Breitel, Controls in
Criminal Law Enforcenent, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 427
(1960); Kaplan, ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment,
60 Nw. U. L. RIv. 174 (1965); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretionin the United States, 18 Am. J. Corn.
L. 932 (1970).
2 A prosecutor trying to develop a policy for selectively enforcing a penal statute will rely upon
his own intuition, training, and values, including
his notions about the purposes of the criminal law,
the role and efficacy of incarceration and other
forms of punishment, general ideas about standards for initiating prosecutions and the specific
traditions of the particular prosecution office.
Abrams, supranote 123, at 21.
n Id. at 5.
16 This assumption is probably false because the
great bulk of defendants will be unable to fulfill the
requirement of raising a reasonable doubt. See discussion in text accompanying note 103 supra.
m On the other hand, some commentators argue that
prosecutors need to limit discretion by creating and
publicizing internal policy guidelines. Davis, supra note
123; Abrams, supranote 123.
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may provide evidence of discrimination and result
in no conviction at all.
Conclusion
As the Court in Mapp v. Ohiom the court in
Falk has made the difficult decision to burden the
criminal justice system in order to protect constitutional rights that otherwise would be jeopardized. While great discretion must be allowed the
prosecutor, this quasi-judicial power must be
watched by the courts. If the courts abdicate this
responsibility, a defendant who has been unconstitutionally discriminated against will have no
effective remedy.
The adoption of the shifting burden of proof
from racial discrimination cases is necessary to
overcome the nearly impossible task of proving
123367

U.S. 643 (1961).
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intentional discrimination by inference. If the
courts insist on requiring that a defendant prove
what a prosecutor is thinking, the courts should
allow the defendant to ask him. Although this
new test would probably encourage many defendants to introduce the defense of prosecutorial
discrimination, few will be successful. Skeptical
courts applying the traditional burdens of proving
both intentional and improper discrimination will
defeat the claims of the overwhelming majority of
defendants. The alleged facts in Falk do not portend differently. The distinguishing feature of
Falk is the admission by the prosecutor that the
defendant was being prosecuted because of his
lawful draft counseling activities. If Falk is adopted
widely, such an admission will be extremely rare.
A better check on the enormous power of the
prosecutor is worth the price of more crowded
court dockets.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CITATION SYSTEM IN EVANSTON, ILLINOIS:
ITS VALUE, CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The bail system as administered in the United
States is beset with many problems. Its inadequacies have been identified by many critics. 1 In
response to such criticisms, alternatives to bail
have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions. 2
This comment will discuss various alternatives to
bail with particular attention focused on the first
year's operation of the citation violation system
which was instituted on September 22, 1971 in
Evanston, Illinois.3 This one year period was
chosen to insure that all cases examined had
reached a final disposition by December, 1973.4
Evanston's system permits a patrolman to issue
a citation to offenders who commit certain misdemeanors.5 The citation orders an offender to
appear in court on a specified date. Before issuing
a citation, the officer must be convinced that the
cited misdemeanant possesses enough ties to
Evanston to render his appearance in court likely.
The citing officer must also be convinced that no
violence will ensue as a result of releasing the
cited offender at the scene of his misdemeanor. If a
patrolman determines that an offender might not
appear as summoned or might continue to perpetrate the offense which first prompted the patrolman's intervention, the officer should make an
arrest and take the offender into custody, thereby
6
subjecting him to the bail system.
1 See, e.g., A. BEEY, THm BAIL SysTrn i CHICAGO (1927) [hereinafter cited as BEELEY]; Foote, The
Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail (pts. 1-2), 113 U.
PA. L. RPv. 959, 1125 (1965); Rankin, The Effect of
PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 641 (1964); Note,
Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YAa LJ.
966 (1961).
2 See, e.g., Ares, Rankin & Struz, The Manhattan
Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of PreTrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67 (1963); Berger,
Police Field Citationsin New Haven, 1972 Ws. L. REV.
382 (1972); Comment, Pretrial Release Under California Penal Code Section 853.6: An Examination of
Citation Release, 60 CAm. L. REV. 1339 (1972).
3JEvanston Police Department, Departmental General4 Order 71-13.
The court records on these cases revealed that it
was not uncommon for one year to eighteen months to
elapse before a case was finally adjudicated. This lag
was primarily a result of continuances. Limiting the
time period to one year, insured that all cases examined
in this study had reached their final disposition.
5See note 50 infra.
6Evanston Police Department, Departmental General Order 71-13.

Before examining Evanston's experience with
citation release, it is necessary to discuss the purpose of the bail system, identify some problems
besetting its administration and examine some
systems designed to replace it. In the United
States, bail is not a matter of specific constitutional
right. Rather, the eighth amendment provides that,
"Excessive bail shall not be required... ." 7 The
Judiciary Act of 1789, however, established the
absolute right to bail in non-capital cases. Congress
provided that "upon all arrests in criminal cases,
bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death ..... 9 With regard to capital
cases, bail was discretionary depending upon the
"nature and circumstances of the offense, and of
the evidence, and usages of law."'10 The amount of
bail required depends upon a number of factors.
In rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the traditional standards for admission
to bail are provided as follows:
If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount
thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the
presence of the defendant, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail, and the
character of the defendant.
The purpose of bail was discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle.u Chief
Justice Vinson, writing for the majority of the
Court, observed that "the fixing of bail for any
individual defendant must be based upon standards
relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence
of that defendant [in court]." 12 In Stack, twelve
petitioners were accused of violating the Smith
Act. Bail was set at $50,000 per defendant." The
Supreme Court concluded that such amount was
excessive and suggested that the petitioners move
for a reduction of bail on the remand of their
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
81 STAT. 73, 91 (1789).

9 Id.
10Id.
"342 U.S. 1 (1951).
2 Id. at 5.
IId. at 1.
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cases.14 The defendants offered evidence of their
"financial resources, family relationships, health,
prior criminal records, and other information" to
establish their reliability, while the Government
introduced no evidence demonstrating the unreliability of these particular defendants. The Government had only shown that four Smith Act
violators, other than the petitioners, who were
convicted in the Southern District of New York
had forfeited bail' In view of the purpose of bail
as applicable to this particular situation, the court
reasoned that $50,000 was not necessary to insure
the defendants' presence and was thus excessive.
In his concurring opinion in Stack, Justice Jackson stated the reasons for the absolute right to
bail in noncapital cases. He argued that bail
affords an offender an opportunity to prepare his
defense unhampered, preserves the presumption of
his innocence and prevents the infliction of punishment before judgment. 6 Justice Jackson also
noted that "[a]dmission to bail. always involves a
risk that the accused will take flight. That is a
calculated risk which the law takes as the price of
our system of justice." 17 It follows from this
statement that the likelihood of flight does not in
and of itself preclude the admission to bail. Furthermore, Justice Jackson observed that "[i]n allowance of bail, the duty of the judge is to reduce
the risk by fixing an amount reasonably calculated
to hold the accused available for trial and its consequence. But the judge is not free to make the
sky the limit."1 Thus not only must bail be admitted in all noncapital cases, but it also must be
set at a reasonable amount which is designed only
to insure the timely appearance of the accused.
While the bail system performs an important
function by providing a means whereby an accused
can remain free pending a final determination of
guilt or innocence, the system has been subject to
substantial criticism. Sitting as a circuit justice in
Bandy v. United States," Justice Douglas considered an application for the reduction of bail. In
the course of his opinion, he observed that
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secure raises considerable problems for the equal
administration of the law.20
Justice Douglas focused his concern on the issue
which has most troubled critics of the bail system
by asking, "Can an indigent be denied freedom,
where a wealthy man would not, because he does
not happen to have enough property to pledge for
his freedom?" 2'
In his classic study, The Bail System in Chicago,
Arthur Lawton Beeley examined the administration of bail in the Municipal Court and Criminal
Courtof Cook County.n The Report of the Wickersham Commission in 1931 commended Beeley on
his work's thoroughness.n It also observed that his.
conclusions were applicable to many other American communities. In general, Beeley found that the
bail system was badly administered in Chicago. He
observed that "notwithstanding the fact that all
accused persons are presumed to be innocent and
that most of them are later discharged, large
numbers of citizens of limited means and influence
are detained." 2 He also discovered that the setting
of bail amount was more a result of arbitrary
standards than it was a function of assessing the
accused's personality, social history, financial
ability and integrity. 25 Individualized determinations of bailability were rare.
As a result of his research, Beeley was able to
determine what types of people failed to make bail.
He also was able to assess which people in this
group could have been released without subjecting
them to the bail system. 26 Beeley found that approximately 50 per cent of the pretrial detainees he
studied were too poor to post the requisite bail.2
Ninety per cent of these offenders were residents
of Chicago at the time of their arrest, and 33 per
cent had lived in Chicago all their lives.n Furthermore, 60 per cent were living with either their immediate families or close relatives at the time of
their arrest.29 Fifty per cent of these unsentenced
prisoners were first offenders.' 0 Beeley also discovered that 50 per cent of the unsentenced jail de20

this bail theory is based on the assumption that a
defendant has property. To continue to demand a
substantial bond which the defendant is unable to

Id. at 198.

21Id.
2BEELEY,

supra note 1.

23NATIONAL COsnuSSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, Sunvwys ANALYSIS 89 (1931).

BExL.y, supranote 1, at 155.
25 Id. at 33.
24

14Id.at 7.
15Id. at 1.
16342 U.S. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring).
7

1

Id.

16d.

1981 S. Ct. 197 (1960).

26 Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
2s Id. at 158.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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fendants were regularly employed. 1 On the basis
of this information, he concluded that 28 per cent
of these detainees should have been released because their various ties to Chicago made them good
release risks.3 2 As a result of identifying these instances of needless incarceration, Beeley made a
number of recommendations which he hoped would
improve the administration of bail. For example,
he suggested that a summonsing procedure take
the place of arrest and bail in cases of petty offenses.
Summonsing would involve issuing a notice to appear; there would be no need to take the suspect
into custody. 3 With regard to the more serious
offenses, Beeley advocated a more individualized
treatment of each offender's application for bail.
He suggested examining "(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the weight of the evidence, (3) the
character of the accused, (4) the seriousness of
punishment following conviction, and (5) the quality of the bail security." 34
After Beeley's pioneering research in 1927,
twenty-seven years elapsed before the administration of bail again was systematically studied in a
metropolitan context. In 1954, Caleb Foote conducted the first of two informative investigations
of bail practices. He first scrutinized the administration of bail in Philadelphia. 3 He discovered that
many offenders were imprisoned while awaiting
trial because they were unable to make bail. For
example, three out of every four serious offenders
did not make bail 6 With regard to other noncapital offenses, 27 per cent of those accused were
unable to obtain pretrial releasePn Bail amounts
were set on the basis of predetermined standards,
however, deviation from these arbitrary standards
did occur. For example, Chief Magistrate Clothier
said that high bail was employed "to break crime
waves." ' Of those offenders detained, 53 per cent
did not spend any time in jail after the disposition
of their case. Of this 53 per cent, 20 per cent were
found not guilty 9 But for their inability to provide
nId.
32Id.
=Id.
at
4

166.

3 Id.at 167.

25Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Adminisfration of Bailin .Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. Rvv. 1031
(1954).
36Id. at 1048.
z7Id.

IsId. at

1038. Chief Magistrate Clothier was referring to the practice of setting high bail to keep offenders in pretrial confinement, thereby restricting the
number of potential troublemakers free on bail.
29Id. at 1049-50.

bail, these offenders would never have "tasted"
jail. As Foote demonstrated, however, these 20 per
cent were fortunate to have obtained their ultimate
release. In his study of effects of pretrial detention,
Foote discovered that "the handicap of being in
jail pretrial may result in a number of convictions
which would not occur were the defendant given
his liberty during the pretrial period." 40 In other
words, pretrial detention correlated with a finding
of guilt. The strength of this correlation was given
more concrete expression in the second of Foote's
bail studies.
At the initiative of Professor Foote, a study of
the administration of bail in New York City was
undertaken in 1957. Many of these findings paralleled the results of the Philadelphia study. For example, 58 per cent of the pretrial detainees who
were interviewed said that they did not possess the
resources to make bail." The effect of detention
was graphically demonstrated in the difference that
existed among defendants receiving suspended
sentences. Fifty-four per cent of the bailed defendants received suspended sentences, while only
13 per cent of the pretrial detainees received
suspended sentences.4 2In another study of bail administration in New York, Anne Rankin discovered
that the inability to make bail may have a significant effect on disposition and sentence She found
that only 17 per cent of the bailed defendants were
imprisoned, while 64 per cent of those detained
were imprisoned. With respect to suspended sentences, she determined that 36 per cent of the bailed
offenders were suspended while only 9 per cent of'
the detained offenders received such treatment. 4
As a result of his findings, Foote made a number
of recommendations concerning bail reform. Many
of his proposals paralleled the suggestions that
Beeley had advanced in his early study. On the
basis of his 1954 findings, Foote advocated the
wider use of a summonsing procedure. 4 In his 1957
study, Foote and his colleagues recommended the
more extensive use of release on recognizance programs. 4' The use of either a summons system or a
4

, Id. at 1058.
A Study of the Administrationof Bail in New
York
City, 106 U. PA. L. Rxv. 693, 711 (1958).
4
Id. at 727.
43Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 641-42 (1964).
41 Note,

44 Id.

45 Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administrationof Bail in Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1031,
1072
46 (1954).
Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in
New York City, 106 U. PA. L. R1v. 693, 730 (1958).
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release-on-recognizance program would eliminate
the most pernicious aspect of the bail system, pretrial confinement as a result of indigency. The recommendations of such pioneering researchers as
Beeley and Foote were adopted in a number of
jurisdictions during the 1960's.
The first major response to the critics of the bail
system came in New York. The Vera Foundation
supervised the so-called Manhattan Bail Project.
Staff members and law students from New York
University conducted interviews with offenders
who were awaiting arraignment. They attempted
to determine whether any of these defendants
would represent good parole risks. These decisions
were made on the basis of a series of questions
which the staff asked. In particular, these questions
focused on the offender's previous employment
record, current charges, family relationships, residence patterns, character references and existing
criminal record. The defendant's responses were
rated and an overall reliability quotient was obtained. If this figure fell within permissible limits,
the defendant's references were investigated. When
his references were verified, the committee assigned
to his case then made a recommendation as to his
pretrial release.47
This procedure worked well for a number of
reasons. Most importantly, it individualized the
bail system. This individualization made it possible
for magistrates making decisions about bail applications to know the personal history of the applicants before them. This improved fact-finding
enabled court officials to feel more confident about
the reliability of an offender they released pretrial.
Because the released offenders demonstrated ties
to the community in which they were freed, the
law enforcement personnel were satisfied that the
alledged offenders would appear at trial on schedule. Furthermore, the inability to make cash bail
was not a factor of crucial consequence in the Manhattan system. Thus, an indigent offender was now
able to obtain pretrial release by establishing adequate community roots.
The appearance rate of the released defendants
was excellent. From October 16, 1961, through
September 20, 1962, only three out of 215 paroled
defendants failed to appear as instructed. In 1960,
101 of the 1,395 bailed defendants randomly sampled did not show for their first court appearance.4s
4
Ares, Rankin & Struz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-TrialParole,
38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67, 70-74 (1963).
8Id. at 86.
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Thus, in a comparison of bail versus parole release
for a period of almost a year in both cases, 7 per
cent of the bailed defendants failed to appear as
directed, while only 1 per cent of the paroled defendants did not show. The difference between the
dispositions of the paroled defendants and a random sample of jailed defendants was marked.
Sixty-four per cent of the detainees were convicted
and imprisoned. While 53 per cent of the parolees
were convicted, only 17 per cent were ultimately
imprisoned pursuant to their conviction." This
comparison indicates that pretrial detention may
have a significant impact on the disposition of any
given case.
Another form of pretrial release which does not
involve economic discrimination is the citation or
summons release. With this procedure, the arresting officer has the option of giving an offender a
citation at the scene of an offender's infraction.
The decision to cite as opposed to the decision to
arrest and take into custody depends upon a number of factors. Different communities have adopted
citation systems, and some variation has occurred.
Some communities stressed the existence of employment and familial responsibilities, while others
required evidence of residence. In most jurisdictions, some evidence of ties to the community where
the offense occurred is required.
On August 23, 1971, the City Council of Evanston, Illinois, enacted a violation citation system °
Evanston's citation release program incorporated
attributes of similar systems which had been developed in Oakland and New Haven. Although
comparisons will be made to the Oakland and New
Haven systems, the focus of this study will be on
the first year of Evanston's operation of the citation system. In a comparison of the citation systems of these three cities, it is necessary to examine
each program's scope and standards for citability.
In Evanston, a citation may be issued for seven
Illinois misdemeanors.i All Evanston Municipal
Code violations are citable except those involving
49

Id. at 82.
50Evanston, Illinois, Resolution 43-R-71, August 23,
1971.
Si The seven state misdemeanors are: Curfew violation, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2371 (1971); simple assault, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-1 (1971); disorderly
conduct, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1(a)(1) (1971);
solicitation of alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 26.1 (1971); Dram Shop Acts,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43 (1971); ticket scalping, IL.
Rxv. STAT. ch. 121Y, § 157.32 (1971); sale, use or
explosion of fireworks, ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 127Y2, § 12&
(1971).
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- deadly weapons, juveniles, prostitution, lewdness,
-sex offenses or traffic offenses. In New Haven, all
misdemeanors except those involving juvenile of-fenders or sex offenses are citable. In Oakland, all
-misdemeanors are citable.
In all three cities, certain circumstantial stan.dards must be met before a citation can be issued.
In Evanston, the officer issuing the citation must
'be satisfied that the offender has given him au-thentic identification. Second, the offender must
not be wanted as a result of any outstanding war-rants. Third, the offender must be a temporary or
-permanent Illinois resident. Fourth, the defendant
must demonstrate enough reliability so that he can
be trusted to appear in court as summoned. Fifth,
-and most importantly, the officer issuing the citation must be convinced that the accused will desist
from whatever conduct prompted his citation in
the first place.5
In Oakland, the limitations on the use of citation
release were expressed in terms of six factors, any
of which would disqualify an offender. Persons in-eligible for citation release were those unable to
care for themselves, those likely to continue or resume the offense in point, those unable or unwilling
to produce adequate identification, those unlikely
to appear in court, those with warrants outstanding
and those who would not sign the citation form or
who demanded immediate arraignment. With respect to the likelihood of court appearance, the
arresting officer must determine whether the offender has enough community roots to warrant
pretrial release.5 In New Haven, four standards
relating to the circumstantial nature of the incident
were required before a citation was issued. A citation was not to be issued if the incident represented
potential for further violence, the offender required
medical attention, the offender was uncooperative
-or the offender was unlikely to appear in court."
Generally, all three systems possessed the same
procedural frameworks. In Evanston and New
Haven, however, the emphasis was on field citations, while in Oakland stationhouse citation was
preferred. Because the offenders were extricated
from the situation as a matter of course in Oakland,
Oakland patrolmen did not have to concentrate on
the situational variables to the same degree that
62 Evanston Police Department, Departmental General Order 71-13.
U Comment, PretrialRelease Under CaliforniaPenal
Code Section 853.6: An ExaminationoJ Citation Release,
60 CAm. L. Rxv. 1339, 1350 (1972).
54Berger, Police Field Citations in New Haven, 1972
Wis. L. Rxv. 382, 400 (1972).

Evanston and New Haven police did. All three
programs were basically confined to misdemeanors.
The context in which these misdemeanors-occurred
had to be devoid of the potential for further violence. Finally, all defendants had to demonstrate a
likelihood of appearing in court.
The benefits of the citation system are several.
It is preferable to the bail system because it does
not involve the invidious consequences of economic
discrimination. At the same time, it assures the
presence of the defendant at his trial-thereby
complying with the purpose of bail."5 This presence
is assured by only releasing offenders who demonstrate ties to the community where the -offenses
occur. The citation system is also superior to the
release-on-recognizance programs because- it does
not involve judicial intervention during the pretrial period. Police officers can release eligible offenders soon after their apprehension. With the
release-on-recognizance procedure, a release recommendation must be approved by a court. The absence of court involvement makes the use of the
citation release more expeditious.
Besides ending economic discrimination and bypassing court involvement, the citation system also
has some other beneficial attributes. The system
affords a considerable saving of police man-hours.
In Evanston, it was estimated that a citation involved approximately fifteen minutes while an
arrest required a minimum of two hours. 6 In Oakland, the citation also required only fifteen minutes
while an arrest consumed an hour.5 In New Haven,
it was estimated that a savings of two hours resulted with the use of the citation system.M The
benefits to offenders are also noteworthy. Besides
no cash deposit, the cited offender does not incur
an arrest record nor does he lose time as a result
of pretrial incarceration. Thus, the cited offender
has an opportunity to prepare his case for trial as
well as to continue work so that he will have the
resources to pursue an appeal if that becomes necessary.
CONSTITUTIONAL QuEsTIONS
Despite the benefits of a citation system, there
are potential constitutional defects inherent to its
55See text accompanying note 12 supra.
16 This information was gathered from a series of
interviews conducted with the Patrol Division of
Evanston's Police Department. For a discussion of
interviewing technique and the confidentiality of this
information, see note 89 infra.
7Comment, supranote 53, at 1361.
r8 BERGER, supra note 54, at 409.
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operation. Three equal protection questions arise
with respect to the use of a citation program. First,
does the delegation of extensive discretion to individual officers create the probability that the system will be applied discriminatorily? Second, can
eligibility for citation be limited to those individuals who possess adequate community roots?
Third, can felons be excluded from the operation
of the system?
Under the fourteenth amendment, all persons
are entitled to the equal protection of the law. 9
The amendment condemns the unequal regulation
of private conduct by state criminal laws. However, unequal regulation of private conduct may
result from discriminatory enforcement practices.'
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held
that:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition
61
of the Constitution.
This landmark case involved extreme discrimination. In the enforcement of a statute that prohibited the operation of laundries in wood frame
buildings, the state agency involved denied permits
to all Chinese applicants, yet it gave permits to all
but one non-Chinese. These permits enabled the
non-Chinese to operate laundries in wood frame
buildings without the possibility of official intervention.
More recently, the concept of discretionary enforcement was discussed in People v. Harris.62 In
this case, gambling statutes were enforced against
blacks only, despite the acknowledged violation of
such statute by whites. The court found instances
of deliberate discrimination since enforcement
officers admitted not raiding gambling parties
which occurred in so-called white "gentlemen's
clubs." 1 In Bargain City U.S.A., Ivc. v. Dil59
The fourteenth amendment provides that "No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
60 Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory E-nforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1103
(1961).
61 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
6 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852
(1960).
0 Id. at 838, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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worth,6 Sunday sale bans involving certain products were enforced against large department while
smaller stores selling the prohibited items went
unprosecuted. The court in Bargain City held that
where intentional discriminatory enforcement practices occurred injunctive relief was available to,
prohibit such activity.65
A number of criticisms have been raised against
the use of the equal protection argument in cases.
where the defendant contends that his conviction
should be reversed because a law was enforced
against him while others went unprosecuted. The
chief argument advanced against such a defense is
that equal protection does not guarantee equal protection of law violators. 66 Put another way, the
right to commit a crime does not exist; therefore,
the equal protection clause does not reach such
conduct even though it may be selectively sanctioned. Another argument which is used to defeat
the extension of the equal protection guarantee to
cases of discriminatory enforcement focuses on the
concern that law violators should not go unpunished merely because law enforcers were unable to
prosecute all law violators.6 Both of the foregoing
arguments reflect a concern that intrinsically harmful acts should be prosecuted despite the fact that
some perpetrators escape prosecution.
These countervailing arguments have not completely vitiated the viability of the discriminatory
enforcement defense. However, this defense is
hedged with two requirements which make its invocation difficult. First, it must be demonstrated
that the discrimination which occurred concomitant with the enforcement was intentional.n Second, if intentional discrimination is proved, it must
be shown that such classification was unreasonable.
Classifications focusing on racial or religious
grounds carry a presumption of suspicion; others
may be reasonably related to the general welfare
and thus escape invalidity.69
In cases of discriminatory enforcement as a result of vesting too much discretion in individual
officers, three problems of proof arise. First, because of the low visibility of discretionary practices
in police enforcement activity, it is difficult to
' The Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, June 22,
1960, p. 1, col. 1 (Phila. County Ct. of Common Pleas
1960).
65
Id.
66Comment, supra note 60, at 1107.
-67Id.
6s Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911).
69 Id.
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secure proof that such activity was intentional.
Police rarely admit to the advertent or inadvertent
practice of discriminatory enforcement. Second,
the defendant must also overcome the presumption
that police act in a regular and proper mannerY°
Third, it is difficult to demonstrate that the classi:fication at issue really exists. A proper showing
often requires that the selective enforcement be
extremely blatant. Anything less than a focus on
one class to the almost total exclusion of other
classes may be explained as a function of chance or
laxity 7
Despite these difficulties of proof, however, the
potential for discrimination in citation systems as
a result of unchecked discretion should not be ignored. The potential of equal protection violations
as a result of discretionary enforcement is attributable to the lack of standardized guidelines which
'regulate the use of the citation procedure. This
problem is compounded by the fact that individual
-officers are vested with the sole responsibility for
,decisions as to citability. Unresolved questions exist in most citation systems as to the relative weight
to be given the standards used in the decision to
,cite or arrestY2 Questions as to the relative weight
among these factors need to be resolved. Furthermore, the delegation of broad decision-making
power to individual officers gives them the opportunity to make citation decisions without adequate
supervision. Hypothetically, an officer may assess
the potential for further violence in similar situations differently as a result of bis predisposition to
the personal characteristics of the parties. Thus, a
decision to use the citation in one situation while
not in another could conceivably be a function of
something other than the situational variables and
an objective determination of the reliability of the
accused. Concededly, this practice may occur with
arrest as well, but the citation procedure invites
such a result by not having definite guidelines as
to the weight to be given the circumstantial variables and by permitting an officer to cite unsupervised: 3
7
0LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law,
Wis. L. Rzv. 104, 136 (1962).
1962
71
id.

72 Comment,

supra note 53, at 1346.
interview data suggest that there was considerable supervisor involvement in Evanston's citation experience. In approximately two-thirds of the
citation incidents, supervisors became involved in one
way or another. However, their involvement was more
a matter of chance than it was a function of duty. The
need exists for supervisor involvement to be made mandatory and guidelines for citation to be formalized.
73 Our

The second constitutional issue involves the
question of whether the community roots' test violates the equal protection clause. The answer to
this question, in turn, depends upon a consideration of residence requirements and their relation to
an individual's right to travel vis-&-vis the states'
right to exercise their police power. In Shapiro v.
Thompson, 4 the right to travel was characterized
as a fundamental right. A residency requirement
conditioning eligibility for welfare payments was
invalidated in the Shapiro case. Residency requirements affecting voting rights have been invalidated
consistently. In Dunn v. Blumstein75 the Supreme
Court held that a one year state and a three month
county residency prerequisite for enfranchisement
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the analysis of the validity
of a residence requirement, two questions must be
answered. First, can the "exercise of state created
rights ... be constitutionally limited only to residents of the state." 76 Second, if so, is a "durational
residence requirement... a constitutionally permissible means for distinguishing residents from
non-residents so as to limit the exercise of the right
to residents only." 7 The answers to these questions depend upon the quality of the right infringed and the reasonableness of the state interest
justifying such infringement.
Arguably, the requirement that an offender establish ties to a given community before he is eligible for citation interferes with that offender's right
to travel. In this case, the state created right which
is denied travelers is the privilege of being cited
instead of being arrested in the event that they
commit a misdemeanor. To retain a discriminatory
classification, the state or subdivision thereof must
demonstrate that the classification either has a rational basis or that it is based on a compelling state
interest.78 The latter test is required if the right
infringed is considered fundamental. 9 The interest
served by requiring a showing of community roots
before citation is one of assuring the appearance of
defendants in court to answer charges. The fulfillment of this interest promotes the more orderly and
expeditious administration of justice. A state's
interest in promoting orderly administration of
74394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
76 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
716Comment, The Demise of the DurationalResidence
Requirement, 26 Sw. LJ. 538, 539 (1972).
7 Id. at 542.
78
Id. at 543.
79
Id.
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justice is legitimate. Furthermore, a state's interest in avoiding no-shows and assuring that
offenders are brought to -trial compels the classification of offenders into residents and nonresidents because residence in the state where the
offense occurs corresponds with a low no-show rate.
Besides the state's compelling interest in securing
the appearance of misdemeanants, the citation system's residence requirement is justified for another
reason. This argument focuses on a consideration of
the alternatives to citation and their consequences.
But for citation release, indigent offenders face the
rigors of pretrial detention. As a result of the citation option, defendants too poor to make bail may
obtain release during the hiatus between their citation and first court date. In the interest of making
the citation system an effective substitute for bail,
the community roots test was devised. By balancing the benefits gained and the detriments incurred, it could be concluded that the citation
system with its residency requirement is a reasonable means by which the appearance of cited offenders can be assured. The discrimination between
resident and non-resident should be tolerated because the citation system eliminates the economic
discrimination associated with bail. Of the two
discriminations, the economic one is argugably
more pernicious than the one limiting mobility. 0
The third constitutional issue involving the
question of equal protection arises as a result of the
narrow scope of the citation system. Offenses other
than misdemeanors should be citable. In an analysis of this third constitutional issue, one must here
again determine whether a right needs to be protected, an infringement of that right has occurred,
and a reason exists which justifies such infringement. The right which is denied as a result of the
narrow scope of the citation system's applicability
is the one which lies at the heart of the citation
system's raison d'tre. The potential for economic
discrimination in the bail system is as great with
respect to felons as it is with misdemeanants. Furthermore, the distinction between certain felonies
and misdemeanors are inconsequential at least as
far as the concerns underlying the citation system
are involved. Assuming that the concerns reflected
in the citation system focus on the cessation of the
offense in point and the likelihood that the offender
will honor his summons to appear in court, felonies
that differ from misdemeanors only with regard to
the value of the merchandise stolen should be
0 Comment, supra note 53, at 1346.

citable. All other things being equal, under thepresent citation systems in Evanston, Oakland and
New Haven stealing property valued one dollar
more than the upper limit for qualification as a
misdemeanor could conceivably subject such a
felon to the inequities of the bail system. Furthermore, the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is rendered less meaningful due to the
practice of plea bargaining. Felonies are commonly
reduced to misdemeanors as a result of the exercise
of prosecutorial discretionn
The reason offered for the exclusion of felonies
from the citation program is that these offenses are
more serious and should be subject to the safeguards of bail. This argument fails to take into
account the nature of bail. In non-capital cases,
bail is a matter of absolute right.12 Thus, given the
offender's financial ability, bail is no impediment
to release despite the likelihood that the offender
might perpetrate other offenses.Y The express terms
of the citation system's guidelines provide that a
citation would not issue in the case of a violent
felony or in a felony where the potential for violence
still exists. The distinction between violent and
non-violent misdemeanors and felonies is compelled by the state's interest in preventing further
harm to its citizens or their property. Thus, it is
not unreasonable to deny citations in incidents
where the potential for further violence exists.
However, officers should have the opportunity to
use the citation system in felony cases where no
potential for further violence exists. If insuring the
presence of the offender in court is the sole purpose
for the requirement of bail, then citation should
serve as a valid replacement of bail provided that
it is as successful in compelling court appearance.
EvANsToN's EXPERIENCE

While this discussion of problems in administration of the citation system is drawn exclusively
from data generated in a study of the first year of
Evanston's program, Evanston's system is representative of other programs, and, therefore, the
following analysis is relevant to other citation release procedures. Furthermore, the urban characteristics of suburban Evanston increase the value
of this data. Evanston does not conform to the socalled "bedroom" suburb pattern. For example,
1

1d. at 1347.
82See text accompanying note 1 supra.
83See Williamson v. United States, 184 F. 2d 280,
282-83 (2d Cir. 1950).
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Evanston has a population in excess of 80,000.84
Approximately, 16 per cent of this total is black.
Blacks represent 17 per cent of the population of
the six county metropolitan area including and
surrounding Chicago. s5 In this respect, therefore,
Evanston is almost a microcosm of the metropolis
which surrounds it.
In an attempt to evaluate Evanston's citation
system, six members of the Northwestern University Law and Society Program's 1972 summer research team examined the effects and implementa0
tion of this system one year after its enactment
In the "effect" branch of the study, court docket
sheets and police arrest records were examined to
determine the dispositions of the citation cases.
The dispositions of the cases which were bailed but
could have been cited were also examined. These
bailed cases were a result of an officer's failure to
invoke the citation procedure. In most cases, such
failure was probably either a function of an officer's
decision that the situation merited arrest or of an
officer's failure torecall that thesystemwas available
as an option.P The no-show rate for both cited
and bailed defendants was also determined.
In the "implementation" branch of the study, a
series of interviews with the Patrol Devision of the
Evanston Police Department were conducted. In
these interviews, it was hoped that the officers
would identify the problems they had encountered
with the use of the citation system. During the last
week of July, 1972 and the first week of August,
1972, sixty-one out of a total of seventy-three
patrolmen were interviewed.P Interviews were
limitea to the patrolmen because they were the
only officers who were issued the citation form
booklets.
The following discussion deals with the reactions
of the Evanston patrolmen to the innovation of
the citation procedure.89 It is followed by a number
8 Planning Department, Evanston, Illinois, Basic
Pof alaln Dataof the 1970 Census, Report #1, July,
1971, at 1 (1971).
at 2-3.
ssid.
86
This research was directed by Professors John
Heinz and -Victor Rosenblum of the Northwestern
University School of Law and Professor Wesley Skogan
of Northwestern University: Department of Political
Science.
8 Twelve percent of the officers interviewed in the
Evanston study indicated that they had failed to use a
citation on an appropriate occasion merely because
they had forgotten that it was available.
8The other twelve patrolmen were either on vacation
or on sick leave when we were conducting our interviews and thus were unavailable for comment.
soBecause we extended a pledge of confidentiality to
our interviewees, the Evanston patrolmen, we will be

of suggestions designed to rectify the potential constitutional defects considered earlier. It is believed
that these constitutional issues can be resolved by
implementing a series of proposals which will also
alleviate many of the difficulties identified by the
patrolmen in their criticisms of the citation system.
The data generated by the "effect" branch of the
study may best be considered in conjunction with
the information gathered in the interviews. These
interviews revealed that the police held a basically
negative view of the citation procedure. Although
there were exceptions to. this general attitude, a
majority of the officers objected to the use of the
citation system for at least three reasons. A majority of officers were convinced that the cited offenders would not appear in court as scheduled.
This concern was reflected in several comments.
One officer felt that "the offenders will take it [the
citation] as a joke." Another patrolman remarked
that "no one will honor a mere piece of paper [the
citation ticket] which is issued at the scene of the
incident." 10 A number of the officers felt that all
criminal law violators should be arrested as a matter of course. These men seemed convinced that
anything less than full arrest and taking into custody would give the offender the impression that
his crime was not seriously regarded. Some officers
also maintained that such an impression would not
deter the offender from resuming the conduct which
had first prompted police intervention. These
officers exhibited much concern about the potential
for further violence. The concern these officers expressed was generated by an inability to assess
unable to identify any of our information by specific
source. However, the interview information is available
for perusal at the offices of the Journal of Criminal
Law & Criminology, 357 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
With respect to interviewing technique, one student
asked the officers questions while another student recorded their responses. At the end of each interview,
the interviewer and recorder alternated roles. The
officers were uniformly cordial and cooperative. Although designed for one-half hour intervals, the interviews were rarely completed within one hour and some
required an hour and one-half. The interview schedule
employed open-ended questions which were to be followed by specific probes. For example, we asked officers
if they had encountered any problems with the administration of the citation system. Following their
response or lack thereof, we questioned them about the
specific problems which we had anticipated as a result
of our study of other citation programs. In preparation
for the analysis of the interview data, we classified the
responses of the officers. This classification enabled us
to discover the relative frequency of any given response.
90 These comments represented the most open evidence of dissatisfaction.
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accurately this potential. This problem was aggravated because the decision to cite was initially
the responsibility of an individual officer.
A majority of the patrolmen also concluded that
the citation would not result in any convictions.
This attitude was manifested in a particularly unfortunate way. Some officers assumed that the citation would not result in a conviction and therefore
used it as a mere warning device. In this respect,
they were promoting the occurrence of their expectation that citations would not result in convictions since they were using them in cases that
should have only involved a warning and not a
formal citation. This practice had the result of
bringing more individuals into the criminal justice
process than had been the case before the institution of the citation system. When asked whether
they would have arrested in cases where they had
issued a citation, seven officers said that they would
not have arrested but for the citation alternative.
The validity of these conclusions is not borne out
by the study's findings. There were 97 citations
issued between September 22, 1971 and September
22, 1972. There were 21 no-shows in the 97 citation
case adjudications. This figure represents a no-show
rate of 22 per cent. During the same year, 248
offenses that were eligible for citation were processed as arrests. Of this number, 37 defendants
failed to appear. This figure represents a 15 per cent
"skip" rate for bailed defendants. On first glance,
there appears to be a significant difference between
the two no-show rates, 22 per cent for the cited and
15 per cent for the bailed. However, this discrepancy loses significance if one examines the circumstances underlying the citation no-shows.
Seven of the 21 no-shows may be explained as a
result of extenuating circumstances. In three of
the 21 no-shows, a family fight was involved. According to our interviews, in these three cases the
complainant-wives did not show up to prosecute.
It is a reasonable inference from this fact that the
husband-defendants' absence was a mere result of
their awareness that their wives were not going
forward with the complaint. In three other cases,
the cited offenders were incarcerated in the Cook
County Jail when their court date arrived. These
individuals were cited at the Howard Street Rapid
Transit Station at the Chicago-Evanston boundary.
Apparently, in the interval between this incident
and their citation appearance date, they were arrested and incarcerated in Chicago. In another
no-show case, the citing officer described the of-
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fender as "deaf, dumb, and mentally unbalanced."
He was only cited at the insistence of the complainant, an Evanston theater owner. Furthermore, one of the apprehending officers supposedly
knew the misdemeanant. In any event, his citation
represented a dubious exercise of the citation prerogative; therefore, it is not surprising that his
failure to appear occurred. Thus, in seven of the
21 citation no-shows, mitigating circumstances existed to explain the reason for non-appearance. If
the citation no-show rate is figured minus these
seven cases, it corresponds exactly to the fifteen
per cent skip rate found with the bailed offenders.
With regard to the fear that the citation would
never result in convictions, the frequency of guilty
verdicts with thisprocedure was 44 per cent. Guilty
verdicts in citation cases included assignments to
supervision or probation and payment of fines. In
arrest cases, the frequency of guilty verdicts was
45 per cent. The verdicts of guilt in arrest cases
consisted of ex parte dispositions, assignment to
supervision or probation, payment of fines, jail
time to serve, time considered served, and commitment to a mental hospital. Thus, dispositions of
guilt seem to be relatively constant regardless of
the form of arrest used.
The frequency of not-guilty verdicts with citation cases was 56 per cent. With arrest cases, the
not guilty frequency was 55 per cent. In both citation and arrest cases, not-guilty type verdicts included dismissals, discharges, leave to file charges,
denials, nolle prosequi, motions to suppress evidence sustained, and non-suits. As with the guilty
verdicts, not-guilty dispositions seem to be relatively constant regardless of the form of arrest
used. With regard to both arrest and citation, the
explanation of a high degree of not-guilty verdicts
rests with the type of offenses citable. That is, the
citable offenses result in not-guilty dispositions
more than 50 per cent of the time no matter which
form of formal action, citation or arrest, brings the
offender into the judicial process. Evidently, the
patrolmen assumed that the form of arrest and not
the quality of the offenses themselves would cause
the high degree of not-guilty verdicts.
In addition to holding these unfounded presuppositions, the patrolmen also complained about
specific procedural difficulties that arose in their
use of the citation system. The most frequently
mentioned administrative problem concerned the
gathering of crowds at the scene of the incident.
Fifty-two per cent of the patrol division said that
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crowds interfered with the citation procedure.
These officers maintained that it was necessary to
remove the offender from the scene of his misdemeanor. According to some officers, the practice of
completing the citation in the field kept them in
the vicinity of the incident longer than usual.
Twenty-five per cent of the officers observed that
the citation procedure could be followed by merely
taking the alleged offender into the squad car and
driving out of the neighborhood. These officers
maintained that a citation could be issued with
greater ease at a less volatile location.
Approximately 30 per cent of the officers interviewed indicated that it was difficult to complete a
citation in the field because they needed informationwhichwasonly available at headquarters. These
officers wanted information about the offender and
his charge. In Evanston, officers are required to
make a warrant check on an offender before they
can issue a citation. Patrolmen also needed information about the nature and extent of an offender's previous record. A number of officers commented that it was impossible to obtain such information over their radios. One officer noted that
air-time was routinely limited to three minute
conversations because the police radio network encompassed a number of communities besides
Evanston. Thus, it was difficult to obtain warrant
checks over the radio. Another limitation on the
use of the radio as an informational source was
caused by the inability of the desk officer to respond
to requests from the field without also neglecting
his stationhouse responsibilities.
PROPOSALS

The incipient constitutional controversies and
the administrative difficulties besetting citation release can be remedied to a large extent. The potential for discriminatory enforcement could be lessened through the adoption of a more refined
citation formula in which the relative weight and
priority of the situational variables would be defined. With a clear-cut set of criteria, an officer
would be able to make more consistent citation decisions. A definition of the relative importance of
the elements in the community roots' test should
be devised also. For example, the following formula
might be used:
Is there any potential for further violence?
(1) To what extent was violence present in
the first place?

(2) Is the offender uncooperative and quarrelsome?
(3) Is the offender inebriated?
(4) Is the offender under the influence of
drugs?
(5) Will the offender and the complaining
witness be in proximity of each other after
the officer departs?
Will the offender appear in court as scheduled?
(1) Does he have adequate identification?
(a) Driver's License.
(b) Social Security Card.
(c) Voter's Registration Card.
(2) Does he live in Evanston or the Chicago
area?
(3) Does he work in Evanston or the Chicago
area?
(4) Does he have relatives in the area?
An unsatisfactory answer to any one of the five
questions under the potential violence question
would result in denial of citation release. As a result of this dear-cut set of criteria, an officer would
be able to make more consistent citation decisions.
As to the question raising the likelihood of court
appearance, unsatisfactory identification would disqualify the offender from further consideration for
citation release. If an offender has reliable identification, he would only be disqualified from further
consideration if he gave unsatisfactory answers to
questions two, three, and four under the likelihood
of appearance question. This formula is merely suggested as a starting point. It can and should be
altered to meet the needs of individual departments. In any event, this formula or a variation on
it would not only restrict an individual officer's
discretion and thus help to prevent discriminatory
enforcement, but it would also promote a more
cautious use of the citation system.
During the interviews, the officers expressed
concern about the propriety of using the citation in
certain situations. For example, they questioned
the appropriateness of invoking its use in family
fight situations or with inebriated offenders. The
explicit set of guidelines formulated above would
offer officers confronted with such difficult field
decisions a means by which they could make
choices between arrest and citation. More explicit
guidelines would also result in more consistent enforcement which thereby would promote equal protection.
Uniformity of practice could also be insured by
only permitting citation at the stationhouse where
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it would be subject to supervision and review. The
decision to cite should be a function of agreement
between the apprehending officer, his sergeant and
the lieutenant in charge of that shift detail. Furthermore, this decision should be subject to review
by a desk sergeant who is regularly entrusted with
the responsibility of interviewing offenders in citation incidents to determine whether their references
corroborate what they have told the apprehending
officer about their residence, job and relatives. This
scheme would divide responsibility of the citation
process. Individual officers would no longer be able
to invoke the citation as a mere warning. The desk
officer review would infuse a measure of procedural
consistency, and this consistency would help to
insure the uniform treatment of misdemeanants
eligible for citation.
Stationhouse summons would also eliminate the
administrative difficulties many of the officers
noted. No crowd problem would exist with stationhouse citation. The unavailability of information
would no longer frustrate officers willing to cite a
given offender but hesitant to follow through for
fear of not discovering an outstanding warrant.
There would be no need to tie up air-time with stationhouse citation. Furthermore, the potential for
violence in a citation incident would be mitigated
by a short trip to headquarters because the cited
offender would have the opportunity to cool down
in an environment removed from his recent misbehavior. As a result of extricating an offender from
the scene of his offense, more emphasis could be
placed on the community roots test. This emphasis
would enable officers to by-pass the more ill-de-
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fined and anxiety-producing situational variables
test.
The problem with residence requirements and
the community roots test was discussed above.
Basically, the community roots test is valid because
it comes under the rubric of a state's compelling
interest in maintaining an orderly and efficient system of criminal law administration. The elimination
of the third constitutional issue would involve the
expansion of the citation system's scope. Felonies
of a non-capital nature should be citable. The success of the community roots test in assuring court
presence with misdemeanants should be extended
to felons. This test is flexible so that the existence
of dangerous situational variables may be used as
a justification for denying citation in any given
case. Since all pecunious defendants may obtain
pretrial release by resort to bail even though they
have committed felonies, impecunious felons should
also have the opportunity to obtain pretrial release
through citation. The problem of equal protection
as between arrest and citation does not exist with
regard to capital felonies because bail is not a
matter of absolute right with them.
The potential viability of the citation system as
an alternative to bail should increase as more jurisdictions like Evanston experiment with similar programs and learn from their experience. Presumably
as more cities implement citation programs, the
courts will have an opportunity to pass on whatever constitutional problems are posed and hopefully these issues will be resolved in favor of a system which makes the opportunity for pre-trial
release available without regard to the financial
status of the offender.

